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We use state and county level variation to examine the impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act on employment.  A cross state analysis suggests that one additional job was created by each $170,000
in stimulus spending.  Time series analysis at the state level suggests a smaller response with a per
job cost of about $400,000.  These results imply Keynesian multipliers between 0.5 and 1.0, somewhat
lower than those assumed by the administration.  However, the overall results mask considerable variation
for different types of spending.  Grants to states for education do not appear to have created any additional
jobs.  Support programs for low income households and infrastructure spending are found to be highly
expansionary.  Estimates excluding education spending suggest fiscal policy multipliers of about 2.0



















On February 17, 2009, the U.S. Congress approved the the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009.  Since then, the success or failure of the ARRA has been hotly 
debated.  In arguing for the bill, supporters claimed that passage would increase output and 
decrease unemployment.  The Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, Christina Romer, 
presented the following graph to show the expected path of unemployment both with and 
without passage of the ARRA. 
 
Figure 1: Estimates of the Impact of ARRA at the Time of Passage versus Reality 
 
 
Added to the graph is a line showing the actual path of unemployment, which rose even faster 
than the scenario without the recovery plan.  In fairness, it was impossible at the time to know 
exactly what the future path would be in either scenario.  This graph was drawn starting with a 
baseline forecast without the ARRA and projecting the improvement that would occur if the 
ARRA were passed.  It is possible that the stimulus was effective but that underlying conditions 
were much worse than predicted in January of 2009. 
 
Unfortunately, direct evaluation of the impact of the bill has proven difficult.  Most claims of 
success or failure have been based on the same models that were used to argue for or against the 
stimulus in the first place.  To a first approximation, most evaluations of the stimulus take the 
difference between the simulated path of output from a scenario with and without the ARRA 
and substitute the actual path of unemployment for the scenario where the ARRA was 







Typical of this approach is Alan Blinder and Mark Zandi’s “How the Great Recession Was 
Brought to an End.”  They use a modified version of a large macroeconomic forecasting model to 
plot the path of the economy both with and without ARRA.2  They conclude 
 
…the effects of the fiscal stimulus alone appear very substantial, raising 2010 
real GDP by about 3.4%, holding the unemployment rate about 1½ percentage 
points lower, and adding almost 2.7 million jobs to U.S. payrolls 
 
This conclusion, however, could have been written before the ARRA was implemented, knowing 
only the intended policy path.  Their methodology does not take any account of the actual path 
of employment after the passage of the bill. 
 
Many evaluations claiming failure of the ARRA suffer from similar problems.  Other model 
based evaluations, such as Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2009) conclude that the 
government spending multipliers are significantly smaller than those claimed by advocates.   
Again, their conclusions are based entirely from existing models and gain nothing from actual 
data on employment before and after the implementation of the ARRA. 
 
In a post on the Congressional Budget Office’s blog, CBO director Douglas Elmendorf is very 
forthright about the inability of these types of evaluations to evaluate actual results. 
 
Although CBO has examined data on output and employment during the period 
since ARRA’s enactment, those data are not as helpful in determining ARRA’s 
economic effects as might be supposed because isolating the effects would 
require knowing what path the economy would have taken in the absence of the 
l a w .  B e c a u s e  t h a t  p a t h  c a n n o t  b e  o b served, the new data add only limited 
information about ARRA’s impact.3 
 
The fundamental problem is the lack of a counterfactual.  We do not know what the path of the 
economy would have been in the absence of the stimulus.  Without a counterfactual, the best we 
can do is fall back on our models.  Unsurprisingly, the models tell the same story today that they 
did when arguments for and against the stimulus were being made. 
 
This paper aims to take a different approach to evaluating the efficacy of the ARRA by looking at 
state and local stimulus spending.  We will use geographic and time series variation in stimulus 
spending to identify the effect of stimulus spending on employment.  Did regions that received 
larger amounts of stimulus dollars have faster employment growth?   
 
One potential difficulty with this approach is that regional variation in stimulus spending is not 
exogenous.  Regions that have been harder hit by the recession may be receiving more transfers.  
In order to deal with this problem we turn to the political economy literature.  Knight (2002) 
                                                           
2Specifically, Moody’s Analytics model of the U.S. economy 
3“Estimated Impact of the Stimulus Package on Employment and Economic Output”, CBO Director’s Blog, 
Aug 24 2010, http://cboblog.cbo.gov/?p=1326.  
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and others have found that the composition of congressional delegations has a significant 
impact on government spending.  States with higher seniority in Congress tend to receive more 
m o n e y  p e r  c a p i t a  t h a n  t h o s e  w i t h  l o w e r  s e n i o r i t y .   I f  w e  t a k e  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  s e n i o r i t y  t o  b e  
unrelated to underlying economic conditions this should provide an instrument for spending at 
the regional level. 
 
We will also examine the time path of the spending at the state level to examine the dynamic 
effect of stimulus spending.  This approach more closely maps to the traditional fiscal policy 
literature by looking at the impulse response from a shock to spending.  The advantage of this 
approach is that the exact time path of the payments from stimulus is likely to have a significant 
random component once the aggregate level of state spending is accounted for. 
 
We will also disaggregate the spending by federal agency.  In examining the spending patterns 
we found that the agencies fell naturally into three groups.  The first group includes agencies 
providing block grants to fund local government employment.  A large proportion of spending 
by the Departments of Education and Justice were used to fund teachers and police at the local 
l e v e l .   T h e  s e c o n d  g r o u p  c o n s i s t s  o f  s u p p o r t  t o  l o w  i n c o m e  f a m i l i e s .   S p e n d i n g  b y  t h e  
Departments of Agriculture, Health Education and Welfare, and Housing and Urban 
Development had a large component of support to low income individuals (food stamps, 
Medicaid, and rental assistance).  The spending of the third group largely consisted of paying for 
new infrastructure projects.  This group includes the Departments of Transportation and Energy 
which funded building projects.   The results for each of the individual agencies within a group 
are very similar. 
 
To preview the results, we find that the stimulus had modestly lower impacts than predicted by 
the administration, though their estimates are well within our confidence interval.  The overall 
results mask significant heterogeneity by type of spending. Transfers to local governments and 
school districts to support teachers and police appear to have no positive effect on employment.  
Programs funding support for low income households generate the largest employment 
response.  Building projects generate a smaller, but still substantial response.  Excluding the 
transfers to local schools and governments, the cost of a job in the stimulus was less than 
$100,000 per year.  Including the transfers to local school districts, this cost increases by at 
least a factor of two.  The implied Keynesian multipliers are between 0.5 and 1.0 in the aggregate 
and rise to 2.0 if one excludes education spending. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
The impact of fiscal policy on output has been studied extensively.  Empirical work in this field 
typically estimates Keynesian multipliers of the sort that underlie the Romer-Bernstein 
estimates of the impact of the ARRA.  The size of these multipliers played a crucial role in 
evaluating the potential efficacy of the ARRA, with advocates arguing that multiplier are large 
and critic arguing that they are small.  Unfortunately, unbiased estimates of fiscal multiplier 
effects are difficult to produce because fiscal policy is generally a response to economic 




There have generally been three approaches used to solve the identification problem created by 
the endogeneity of spending.  First, is the use of structural vector auto-regressions (SVAR) 
pioneered by Blanchard and Perotti (2002).  They find spending multipliers in the vicinity of 
one.  More recently, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) find that fiscal policy is more effective 
d u r i n g  r e c e s s i o n s ,  f i n d i n g  m u l t i p l i e r s  a s  h i g h  a s  t w o ,  t h o u g h  t h e y  f i n d  t h a t  t h i s  i s  m o s t l y  
concentrated in military spending. 
 
T h e  s e c o n d  a p p r o a c h  i s  t o  s e a r c h  f o r  e p i s o d e s  o f  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  i n n o v a t i o n s  t h a t  w e r e  n o t  
motivated by current economic conditions.  The most recent work by Romer and Romer (2010) 
on tax changes in the US uses this approach.  They examine the narrative record to find episodes 
where congress changed tax laws for reasons that excluded current conditions.  Some of the 
exogenous changes they identify are those related to budget deficit reduction or that are 
ideologically driven.  They find multiplier in the range of about three for exogenous tax changes 
in the US.   
 
Other papers using this general approach use changes in military spending as exogenous shocks.  
These papers include Barro (2009), Ramey and Shapiro (1998), and Ramey (2008).  These 
papers tend to find multipliers that are less than one.  Feyrer and Shambaugh (2009) exploit the 
Romer and Romer shocks to look at the impact of US fiscal shocks on the rest of the world.  
Their results suggest a significant proportion of tax shocks are absorbed abroad. 
 
There has also been some work done using state level variation in spending.  Shoag (2010) uses 
variation in state pension plan returns to instrument for state spending and finds a multiplier of 
about two.  $35,000 in spending is associated with one additional job.  Clemens and Miran 
(2010) exploit the variation in state level balanced budget rules to identify the effect of fiscal 
policy at the state level.  They find that $25,000 in additional state spending results in one 
additional job.  This suggests a rather large fiscal multiplier at the state level. 
 
One potential problem with all previous work in fiscal policy is external validity.  The size of the 
ARRA is much larger than anything we have seen before, the output gap is much larger, and the 
Federal Reserve is at the zero bound.  All three factors suggest that the response of the economy 
to the ARRA is likely to be different than the response to increased military spending and tax 
innovations that occurred during periods of small output gaps.  The response of the economy to 
fiscal policy is also dependent on the Federal Reserve’s response function.  Woodford (2011) 
suggests that the multipliers will be higher when interest rates are at the lower bound. 
 
There is also reason to believe that the type of spending matters significantly.  Standard 
K e y n e s i a n  t h e o r y  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  d i r e c t  g o v e r n m e n t  s p e n d i n g  w i l l  h a v e  a  l a r g e r  i m p a c t  t h a n  
transfers.  The impact of transfer payments will be higher for high marginal propensity to 
consume individuals.  This makes it difficult to draw conclusions about the ARRA based on 
studies that are limited to military spending or tax changes taking place under non-recessionary 
conditions. 
 
T h e  f a c t  t h a t  m u l t i p l i e r s  m a y  v a r y  g r e a t l y  b y  t y p e  o f  s p e n d i n g ,  a m o u n t  o f  s p e n d i n g  a n d  
economic conditions suggests that a direct examination of the current episode may be useful.  As  
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discussed in the introduction, very little discussion of the ARRA has incorporated real time data.  
There are two notable exceptions to this.  Wilson (2010) has written a state level analysis of jobs 
and stimulus spending that we draw on for our state level results.  He finds that the ARRA had 
positive stimulus effects, but that the results are sensitive to the time frame over which the 
evaluation is taking place.  We will go beyond his work by using county level variation and 
focusing on the time series variation in spending.  Cogan and Taylor (2010) have looked at the 
impact of grants to the states in the ARRA and conclude that states did not alter spending 




The fiscal policy literature generally expresses impacts in terms of fiscal multipliers.  That is, 
how much additional GDP will be produced for each dollar of additional government spending?  
Like Wilson (2010), we will focus on change in the number of jobs rather than the level of 
output.  The main reason for this is data constraints.  We have good monthly measures of the 
number of people employed at the state level. We do not have similar real time numbers for 
state GDP.  Employment and GDP are, of course, closely related and we will do some simple 
transformations using the Okun’s law relationship between employment change and GDP 
growth. 
 
The analysis that we present is necessarily preliminary.  It has only been 20 months since the 
first dollars started to arrive and fiscal policy is generally thought to take 24-36 months to reach 
full impact.  We take three general approaches.  First, we examine the overall change in 
employment over the sample period against the overall quantity of stimulus spending at the 
state level.  This is quite similar to work done by Wilson (2010) at the state level.  Second, we do 
the same exercise at the county level.  Finally, we examine month by month spending at the state 
level and generate impulse responses of employment to the state level spending changes.   
 
These three approaches have very different sources of identification.  The state level cross 
section gives the broadest picture with the most complete data.  Because the identification is 
coming from state level variation, we can control for aggregate national shocks.  The county level 
analysis allows us to further control for state level shocks, exploiting the idiosyncratic 
differences in spending by county.   The time series results similarly allow us to control for the 
aggregate level of state spending and get identification though the idiosyncratic timing of the 
spending. 
 
After examining the effects of overall stimulus spending on employment we further cut the data 
to look at different types of stimulus spending (do block grants for teachers have a different 
impact than expanding food stamp eligibility?) and different types of employment responses 
(did the stimulus create more education jobs than construction jobs?) 
 
One disadvantage of moving to disaggregated data is that we miss any nationwide and global 
impacts from ARRA.  The multiplier effects from stimulus spending at the local level will be 
reduced by the marginal propensity to import from outside the region being examined.  This will 
potentially be more important for some kinds of spending than others.  Road construction is a  
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localized phenomenon in some regards (wages will be paid in the state where the road is built), 
but national in others (new equipment and materials may be sourced out of state).  Low income 
individuals may be more likely to spend locally than middle income individuals.  This effect will 
also necessarily reduce the county level impacts relative to the state level. 
 
For this reason the positive effects on job growth and wages that we find will likely be lower 
bounds and possibly significant understatements of the total effects of ARRA.  One goal of 
ARRA was to increase business and consumer confidence nationally.  We do not capture these 
aggregate effects. 
 
IIIa  Cross Sectional Analysis 
  
We regress the change in employment per capita on stimulus spending per capita at the state 
and county level, 
 
  ∆                ∗                           (1) 
  ∆                       ∗                           (2) 
 
where epop is the employment to population ratio.  The county level regressions allow for the 
inclusion of state level controls.     
 
Since we are regressing jobs per capita on stimulus per capita, our coefficients can be 
interpreted as jobs per hundred thousand dollars.  This is a loose interpretation since in reality 
there is a flow of spending creating a flow of jobs.  Since the time series results explicitly deals 
with the time path, this is less of an issue for these results.  
 
One concern with our cross sectional approach is t h a t  s t i m u l u s  s p e n d i n g  i s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  
endogenous.  States that were hardest hit by the recession may have received disproportionate 
amounts of stimulus spending.  At the state and county level we deal with this concern by 
turning to the political science literature on the relationship between relatively idiosyncratic 
political power and spending.  States with longer serving congressional delegations have higher 
seniority and more access to committee chairmanships and other leadership positions. 
 
Higher seniority at the state level is therefore positively correlated with federal spending by 
state.  We will exploit this variation to instrument for the level of stimulus spending.  For each 
House and Senate member we collected current party, years of seniority, seniority rank relative 
to other House (Senate) members, and Chair of a n y  c omm it t ee s  or  Ca u c u s.   We  ha v e  tr ie d 
predicting stimulus spending per capita using mean ranks (seniority with 1 being the most 
senior) of a state’s House and Senate delegations and with the number of committee chairs held 
by the House and Senate delegations.   
 
Empirically ARRA spending per capita across states is not particularly correlated with 
committee chairs or with the seniority of a state’s senators.  However, the mean seniority of a 
state’s House delegation is strongly correlated with the stimulus dollars per capita received by a 
state.  Our finding in this regard is consistent with the existing political economy literature  
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which also uses mean seniority at the state level to predict spending.  As a result we confine 
ourselves to using mean seniority of the House delegation as our single instrument for stimulus 
spending per capita. 
 
Another predictor of stimulus per capita is the population of the State.  Small states such as 
Montana and Wyoming received many more dollars per capita than more populous states.  This 
could be a result of the structure of the Senate (ie two Senators per state regardless of 
population) or it could be in part a reflection of the fact that less populous states have many 
more miles of highways and bridges per capita than densely populated states.  However we are 
naturally concerned that population size may be directly correlated with employment and wage 
growth during the recession and we therefore we report robustness checks that include the log of 
population as a control on the right hand side rather than using as it an instrument.   
 
IIIb.  Dynamic Responses 
 
We also look at the impact of the stimulus spending in a state level panel.  By using a monthly 
panel we can control for the overall level of stimulus spending at the state level, getting 
identifying variation from the changes in spending on a month to month basis.  For these 
regressions we do not have the luxury of an instrument for spending.  However the time series 
allows us estimate the impacts in differences, effectively controlling for state level difference in 
the size of the initial shock.  Our identification is coming from idiosyncratic differences in the 
timing of spending at the state level. 
 
There are clearly some types of spending for which relying on the timing of spending is more 
problematic than others.  In particular, spending on unemployment insurance is directly tied to 
the level of unemployment.  For this reason we will exclude unemployment insurance in some 
specifications.  It should be noted that the bias from programs tied to economic performance is 
against finding an effect of the stimulus. 
 
The analysis follows the approach of Romer and Romer’s paper examining tax changes.  We 
regress the change in the employment to population ration on a set of leads and lags of the 
change in spending.  By summing these coefficients we generate the response over time to a 
permanent change in spending.  The basic regression is: 
 
  ∆               ∑    ∗ ∆                     ,    
    
          (3) 
 
The summation of the lag coefficients, 
 
              ∑   
    
     (4) 
 
gives the response to a permanent change in spending per capita at various time horizons.   
These responses functions will be presented as graphs.  All results use 2 leads and 8 lags, though 
the results are not sensitive to different lead and lag structures.  Compared to the traditional  
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fiscal policy literature we are looking at relatively few lags.  This is necessitated by data 
constraints. 
 
IV.  Data 
 
Data on stimulus spending comes from the website www.recovery.gov which is maintained by 
the US federal government.4  We use two different measures of stimulus spending.  First, we use 
what are called "Agency Reported" data at the state level.  These data are reported by roughly 25 
major federal agencies and detail what dollars were allocated to which states.   The agencies 
include all of the cabinet level departments such as Department of Transportation and 
Department of Education as well as the Social Security Administration, the National 
Endowment for the Arts, the National Science Foundation etc.  We will use both the aggregate 
spending across all agencies and the individual agency spending for the larger agencies.  For the 
panel data, we use monthly outlays to each state as reported as reported by each Agency.  Table 1 
lists agencies with over $100 million in spending through September 2010 followed by 
categories that received over one billion dollars. 
 
Means for the state level data are shown in the first panel of Table 2.  Spending is reported in 
two different ways, obligations and outlays.  Obligations represent projects that have been 
approved, but may not have received funding.  Outlays represent money that has actually been 
disbursed to projects.  For the cross sectional r e s u l t s ,  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  w h i c h  t o  u s e  i s  n o t  
particularly important as they track each other closely.  For the time series results we use the 
outlays data on actual money spent.  Our understanding is that projects present bills for 
reimbursement after work has been completed so that the timing of outlays closely matches the 
performance of the funded project.  Obligations are a much less clean source of time variation.   
Stimulus per capita averages around $1100.  The state level (Agency Reported) data on funds 
announced account for about $280 billion worth of spending.   We expect the total to be 
significantly less than the $765b ARRA since $288b of that total was allocated to tax relief and 
much of the spending beyond tax relief was allocated to entitlement programs including 
extensions of unemployment insurance.5  O f  t h e  t o t a l  A R R A  m o n e y ,  $ 4 5 2  b i l l i o n  i s  p a r t  o f 
agency spending that is captured in the agency reports as funds available.  Only $347 billion of 
the $452 has actually been announced as part of specific grants, loans and contracts.  Of the 
$347 billion that has been announced, only $284 billion is allocated to specific states with the 
other $63 billion being federal spending not allocated by the agencies to a state. 
 
The second source of data is "Recipient Level Reports."  These are reports submitted by 
individual state governments, departments within state governments, local school districts and 
individual private contractors.  These data include 362,000 reports of stimulus money received.  
These reports include everything from the $4.4 billion block grant received by the State of 
California to support employment within public secondary and elementary education to the 
$1,806 received by Bizzak Logging to treat noxious weeds on Forest Service land.6  
                                                           
4 Specifically we pull data from this location: http://www.recovery.gov/FAQ/Pages/DownloadCenter.aspx 
5 See http://www.recovery.gov/About/Pages/The_Act.aspx.  We are still surprised that the Agency reported data do 
not add up to a larger figure given that  




The recipient reports are necessarily less accurate and complete than the agency reports.  They 
do, however, have two advantages.  First, the recipient reports are at the county level where the 
agency reports are at the state level.  We aggregate the recipient reports to the county level by 
using the 5 digit zip code of the ARRA recipient.7  Second, the recipient reports include data 
such as reported jobs created that are not available in the agency data.  These are obviously 
imperfect, but it may be of interest how many jobs the recipients claim to have created or saved. 
 
One problem is that we wish to avoid double counting that would occur by treating a large block 
grant received by a state as if the grant had all been spent at the state capital.  To avoid double 
counting, we use the dollars reported as the "local amount" spent as opposed to the total grant.  
As an added precaution we also drop all money received directly by state agencies and state 
governments since the vast majority of those dollars are block grants which are subsequently 
sent to local governments and to contractors who themselves report the receipt of the money.  
Finally we drop the counties that contain the state capitals. 
 
There is still no guarantee that all of a given grant or contract was spent within the confines of 
the county of the reporting receipient.  Spending in a given county can clearly spill over to 
employment or wages in a neighboring county.  As such we expect the measurement error of 
where the money is actually spent to cause our county level estimates of the impact of ARRA to 
be smaller than our state level estimates. 
 
The means in Table 2 panel 2 show that stimulus per capita averages $304 in the average 
county.  This equates to roughly $85 billion in spending that we can allocate at the county level.  
Prior to our attempt to allocate to the county level, the recipient level data have local spending 
amounts for about $237b worth of spending.  When we drop amounts that are associated with 
block grants which are sent to state agencies, we are left with $176 billion.  The fact that we are 
using "local amounts" as opposed to total award amounts should have already eliminated this 
block grant issue but it appears that some large state level grants remain classified as local 
spending.  Furthermore of the $176 billion, we can only allocate $85 billion to counties.  Most of 
the remaining amounts do not have zip codes in the data.8   
 
Our data on employment and earnings come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.9  At the state 
level we pull monthly employment and earnings data from the Current Employment Statistics 
(CES) survey.  To collect these data, state agencies assemble data for a large sample of 
establishments.  Roughly 140,000 businesses and governments are sampled and this represents 
410,000 individual worksites.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.recovery.gov/About/Documents/InitialRecoveryActImplementingGuidance_Feb18.pdf.  
7 We associate each zip code with a county using a cross walk file developed by the University of Missouri Census 
Data Center.
7  When zip codes cross county lines we assign the zip to the county containing the largest portion of 
the zip code population.   
8 We do have congressional district associated with these awards and we could in theory allocate to counties based 
on that but this is not likely to be terribly accurate. 
9 See http://www.bls.gov/data/#employment   
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For our state and state by month panel we consider the difference in employment per capita 
across two different months.  For the cross sectional results we calculate the effect of ARRA 
based on the change in log employment between February 2009 and October 2010.  Our 
b a s e l i n e  r e s u l t s  a r e  f o r  t o t a l  e m p l o y m e n t  b u t  w e  a l s o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  A R R A  o n  a l l  
government employment, federal, state, local government employment and private sector 
employment.   
 
For county level employment and earnings we pull data from the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (QCEW).  These data come from quarterly tax filings submitted to state 
agencies in connection with Unemployment Insurance.  The program covers more than 99 
percent of all wage and salary civilian workers.  For earnings, we use average weekly earnings of 
all private sector employees.  We regress the change in log(weekly earnings) on stimulus 
spending per capita. 
 
Our data on the seniority of members of Congress comes from the list maintained by 
Wikipedia.10  We spot checked it and found it to be accurate. 
 
V.  Results 
 
In Table 3 we present our baseline results at the state level.  In column (1) we regress the change 
in employment per capita (from 2/09 to 10/10) on stimulus spending per capita in hundreds of 
thousands of dollars.  We find a coefficient of 0.54 which suggests that each $100,000 spent 
created 0.54 jobs.  If we control for the log of population, the coefficient rises to 0.59 (column 
2).     
 
The basic state level cross sectional result can be seen in Figure 2 in which we show a scatter plot 
of changes in the employment to population ratio over the period against stimulus spending per 
capita.  There is a clear positive relationship between employment outcomes and spending per 
capita.  Alaska is a clear outlier having received more than $2,000 per capita.  If we drop Alaska, 
the slope changes from .54 to .67. 
 
We are concerned about the possible endogeneity of spending and in particular more money 
may have been sent to states that were hardest hit by the recession.  To control for this selection 
we instrument for stimulus spending per capita using the mean seniority in a state's delegation 
to the House of Representatives. We measure seniority as the rank (1 to 435) with 435 being the 
least senior.   
 
As expected, states with less senior delegations receive fewer stimulus dollars per capita.  This 
first stage is shown in column (4).  Mean seniority rank has a standard deviation of 50.  A one 
standard deviation decrease in seniority (i.e. mean rank increases by 50) is associated with a 
decrease of $165 per capita of spending.  Economically this is meaningful and represents a 0.48 
standard deviation drop in stimulus per capita.  
                                                           
10 See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_current_members_of_the_United_States_House_of_Representatives_by_senior
ity   
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Figure 2: Long Change in Employment versus Stimulus Spending Per Capita 
 
spending per capita is in hundreds of thousands of dollars per capita.  Change in employment is difference 






The second stage of the instrumental variables regression is shown in column (3).  The result 
implies that a $100,000 increase in stimulus creates one additional job.  The t statistic on this 
coefficient is 1.79. 
 
To try to increase precision we try running a similar regression with a state*month panel.  These 
results are shown in columns (5)-(6).  Rather than using the difference in employment per 
capita as the dependent variable, we use the level of employment per capita and include state 
fixed effects.  We cluster standard errors at the state level.  An advantage of the state month 
panel is that all pre and post observations for employment are used rather than simply two 
endpoints.  In the panel OLS (column 5), a $100,000 increase in spending is associated with a 
1.4 additional jobs.  In the IV results (column 5) this coefficient rises to 2.3 jobs.   
 
To put these numbers in perspective we attempt to translate them into dollars spent per job year 
and we compare our results to White House assumptions.   The OLS coefficient in column (1) 
implies that $100,000 created .54 jobs.  Since this takes place over roughly 20 months (Feb 09 
to August 10) we could think of this as 0.54*(20/12) job years which implies roughly $111,000 
per job year.  If we take the larger OLS estimate from the state month panel, we get $43,000 per 
job year.  The White house anticipated that during 2010, ARRA spending would create 3.0 
million jobs from $787 billion of spending.  (See the Jobs Report issued in May 2009).11    If we 
assume that these three million jobs existed over the entire 20 month period, that would imply 
$157,000 per job year. 
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In Table 4 we run the state month panel specification but we divide employment into 
government versus private employment.  Column (1) shows that a $100,000 increase in 
stimulus per capita is associated with a .20 government jobs.  Columns (2)-(4) show that most of 
this effect (0.13) comes from local government jobs.  The fact that very little of the effect comes 
from federal jobs is reassuring especially as we are excluding Washington DC from the analysis.  
The effect on private sector jobs is much larger with each $100,000 creating .90 private jobs. 
 
Table 5 breaks down the stimulus spending by federal agency that disbursed the funds.  As 
mentioned above we group the agencies into ones that represent block grants to states to 
maintain employees, infrastructure (Departments of Energy and Transportation) and agencies 
that provide support for low income families and individuals (HHS, HUD and USDA).  The 
point estimates are extremely noisy but may suggest that infrastructure spending and low 
income supports are more effective at creating jobs than block grants to states. 
 
Table 6 is our county level analysis of effects on employment.  The benefit of moving to the 
county level is the potential for more identifying variation.  This comes with two large costs.  
First, as detailed above, we are only able to correctly apportion $85 billion of the spending to 
counties.  Second, the potential for spillovers across counties is quite large.  The spillovers could 
result from macro multipliers as income earned from stimulus work is spent in other counties 
becoming income for another person.  But the even simpler "spillover" story is that money 
labelled as being received in one county may be spent in a neighboring county as the private 
contractor or local agency carries out its mission.   
 
Both because of measurement error and because of spillovers across counties, we anticipate that 
our county level coefficients will be smaller than our state level coefficients.  This is what we 
find.  The OLS results in column (1) imply that each $100,000 of stimulus spending per capita 
results in 0.15 jobs.  In column (2) we weight by county population and the coefficient falls to 
0.04 jobs.   
 
We again attempt to instrument for stimulus spending with the mean seniority rank of a state's 
House of Representatives delegation.  Even though the first stage regression (Column (5)) works 
a s  b e f o r e ,  t h e  s e c o n d  s t a g e  s u g g e s t  v e r y  l a r g e  e f f e c t s  f r o m  s p e n d i n g  o n  e m p l o y m e n t  a t  t h e  
county level.  Each 100,000 spent is associated with 3 additional jobs. 
 
In Table 7 we turn to the effects on log (earnings) using the county level data.  In the OLS, a 
$100,000 increase in stimulus spending per capita is associated with a 275 percent increase in 
earnings.   Putting this on a scale closer to the actual level spent, we could think of this as a 2.75 
percent increase in income from each $1000 in stimulus per capita.  While seemingly large, 
these numbers are plausible given the massive size of the ARRA.  Suppose we take US GDP per 
capita to be $47,000 (CIA World Factbook) and that labor's share of GDP is 70 percent (St. 
Louis Fed 2004)12.  And suppose ARRA spending on grants and contracts was $450b.  These 
figures imply that ARRA spent $1607 per American on grants and contracts relative to U.S. 
                                                           
12 http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/net/20040801/cover.pdf.    
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labor income of $32,000.  That means that ARRA spending was a full 5 percentage points of 
total US labor income and this number falls between our OLS and our IV estimate. 
 
Finally in Table 8 we switch the dependent variable to recipient reports of "jobs created or 
saved."  These are the jobs reported in the recipient level reports and these are highly correlated 
with reports of money received.  We use the county level data to regress reported jobs created or 
saved (expressed as a fraction of the county's baseline number employed) on reported dollars 
per capita spent.  Each $100,000 spent is associated with a 0.36 increase in jobs.  Our scaling 
calculation suggests a cost per job year of $167,000.  Again this assumes that the job was created 
for all of the 20 months in the sample and then disappeared after the 20 months.  More 
realistically the average job probably was not created immediately in February 2009 but could 
last significantly after October 2010. 
  
VI. Time Series Results 
 
The time series results are presented as impulse response functions. (Tables 9 and 10 contain 
some of the underlying regressions).  The sums of the coefficients presented in the impulse 
response graphs are the cumulative change in the employment to population ratio over time 
after a spending shock scaled to $100,000 per capita.  Because both the spending and jobs 
counts are scaled to population, the coefficients can be interpreted as the number of jobs per 
$100,000 per month increase in spending.  On a yearly basis it is the number of jobs for each 
$1.2 million in spending.  All response functions are surrounded by a band indicating the 90-10 
percent confidence interval.  Figure 3 shows the overall impact of the ARRA. 
 
The overall response is modest, with an increase of 2-3 jobs per $100,000 increase in monthly 
spending.  It takes about 3 months for the full impact to take place, after which the impact is 
relatively constant.  In terms of yearly spending the cost was about $500,000 per job.  The 
standard errors are large and we cannot reject that the impact is nearly twice as large.  Typically 
fiscal policy shocks are found to take 3-4 quarters to have their full impact.  Given the short time 
series that we have available, going beyond 3 quarters is impractical at this point.  The effects 
appear to be leveling off at a lag of 8 months.  Estimates done using a larger number of lags 
suggest the impacts are peaking at this point and potentially beginning to move downward. 
 
Examining the impact by type of spending reveals interesting differences.  Figure 4 shows the 
impact of spending at the agency level for agencies spending over one billion dollars by 
September, 2010.  Grouping agencies with similar patterns reveals three major groups.   
 
First are agencies that are engaged in grants for building projects.  Department of 
Transportation ARRA money largely is being spent on highways, ports, and airport projects.  
Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency projects similarly are funding 
energy and environmental projects.  In both cases, the money appears to be funding projects 





Figure 3: The Overall Impact of the ARRA 
 
 





The second major grouping is support programs for low income households. The majority of 
USDA spending went to an expansion of food stamps.  HUD spending was spent on rental 
assistance and public housing projects.  HHS spending went to Medicaid.  A substantial part of 
the money for low income support came in the form of matching funds to the states, particularly 
Medicaid.  We therefore may worry that this money was essentially a fungible transfer to the 
states despite the nominal targeting of low income individuals.  This concern is mitigated by the 
fact that the money was only available if states agreed to leave existing eligibility rules in place.  
In other words, states were obligated to cover the additional individuals that became eligible due 
to the recession and could not simply use the money to cover imbalances elsewhere.  This money 
was also in the form of an increase in the rate of matching funds, so decreases in state level 
support reduce the level of federal transfers. 
 
The third major grouping was in the form of grants to local governments to support teachers 
and police from the Departments of Education and Justice (Homeland Security also spent some 
money supporting first responders, but this was a relatively small amount).  As far as we can tell, 
this money came with far fewer structural restrictions compared to the state level transfers for 
low income support.  Municipalities had more flexibility to use this money to offset other budget 
categories. 
 
The only major funding agency that does not fit neatly into these three categories is the 
Department of Labor, whose spending largely went to extensions of unemployment insurance.  
This spending is obviously problematic for our analysis because the distribution of these funds is 
directly related to the employment rate.  Extension of unemployment insurance also benefits a 
much more diverse income group than the low income support programs (though clearly 
beneficiaries are experiencing a temporary shock).  Interestingly, this is the only agency that 
shows a substantial pre trend in the effects of the stimulus. 
 
Figure 5 shows the impulse response functions by each of these groupings.  The differences 
become more obvious in this view.  Support for low income households have the largest positive 
impact, followed by transportation and energy projects.  Transfers to municipalities to fund 
teachers and police have if anything a negative impact. 
  
Figures 6 and 7 zoom in on the components of the two larger spending categories.  All three low 
income support programs have a positive impact, but the effect is larger for the two programs 
that directly give cash, food stamps and rental assistance.  In both cases the impacts are 
significant at the 99 percent level.  The transfers to municipalities are negative in all three cases, 
though not significantly so. 
 
Figure 8 shows the results of including everything but education and unemployment extension 
spending in the analysis.  Non education stimulus has a significant positive impact on 
employment and is significant at the five percent level three and four months after the shock 
( a n d  a t  t h e  t e n  p e r c e n t  l e v e l  f o r  m o s t  o t h e r  t i m e  h o r i z o n s ) .   A n  i n c r e a s e  i n  s p e n d i n g  o f  
$100,000 dollars per month will generate a bit over 10 jobs.  Assuming that these coefficients  




Figure 5:  Responses by Types of Spending 
 




Figure 7:  Teachers and Police, Building Projects 
 
Figure 8:  All Spending but Department of Education and Department of Labor 
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remain at this level indefinitely (which is likely a generous assumption) this indicates a cost of 
about $100,000 per job over the course of a year for this subset of spending. 
 
VII. Education Spending and Employment 
 
Block grants to support local education agencies have very small (and statistically insignificant) 
impacts on employment.  At first blush this may seem surprising given that the money was 
described as support to avoid layoffs of needed public employees.  But Figure 9 may help 
convince readers that ARRA's effects on education hiring were in fact small relative to the total 
dollars spent.  We graph total employment in education month by month from 2007 through 
January 2011.  These data are from the Current Employment Survey data used in the paper.  We 
include state and local government employees working in education. 
 
Figure 9: Education Employment ('000) Over Time 
 
Data are from the BLS monthly Survey of Employment. 




Note that during the initial phase of the recession, educational employment halted its traditional 
g r o w t h  p a t h  a n d  d i p p e d  b y  a b o u t  3 0 , 0 0 0  j o b s  t o  a b o u t  1 0 , 4 3 8 , 0 0 0  p e o p l e .   F o l l o w i n g  t h e  
passage of the stimulus package, education employment had a small increase and then a slow a 





































































2006m1 2007m1 2008m1 2009m1 2010m1 2011m1
Year and Month 
20 
 
( 8 0 , 0 0 0  j o b s )  a f t e r  J u n e  2 0 1 0 .   T h i s  t i m i n g  m a y  a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  f a l l  i n  A R R A  o u t l a y s  t h a t  
happens toward the end of 2010. 
  
What is a plausible counterfactual for the decline of education employment in the absence of the 
stimulus?  Perhaps in the absence of ARRA an additional 80,000 jobs would have been lost 
during 2009 and 2010.  This would attribute all of the job loss in June 2010-2011 to the 
anticipated winding down of ARRA spending.  If we divide the $68 billion spent on education 
block grants by 80,000 jobs held for 18 months, this implies a cost of $567,000 per job year.  
While that number sounds large, the raw data show that changes in educational employment 
were small relative to spending by the Department of Education.  One needs to construct a 
counterfactual where education employment falls very steeply in order to generate a per job cost 
that is in a reasonable range. 
 
This suggests that local government hiring patterns were at most modestly affected by these 
block grants.  Our interviews and research indicate that State Departments of Education advised 
local education agencies to avoid making permanent hires since the money was explicitly 
temporary.  Our results may imply that the block grants allowed schools to maintain their 
staffing patterns without increasing taxes or hav i n g  s t a t e s  i n c u r  a d d i t i o n a l  d e b t  i n  o r d e r  t o  
support the schools in their state.  In other words block grants for education may have funded 
staffing that would have occurred anyway but would have been financed through increased 
taxation and state and municipal debt as opposed to Federal debt.  This echoes the conclusions 
of a recent paper by Cogan and Taylor (2010) which finds that state spending was largely 
unaffected by stimulus spending. If the money were spend on avoiding tax increases this may 
have had a stimulus effect.  Cogan and Taylor suggest that much of the transfers to states were 
u s e d  t o  r e d u c e  b o r r o w i n g  w h i c h  i s  l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  l i m i t e d  s t i m u l u s  e f f e c t s .   O u r  r e s u l t s  a r e  
consistent with this hypothesis. 
 
   
21 
 
VIII. Keynesian Multipliers 
 
How do our results compare to traditional Keynesian multipliers?  Our results are in terms of 
jobs created for each dollar spent.  By using Okun’s law we can transform job creation into GDP 
growth.  The coefficients in the cross sectional regressions are in terms of β jobs created by 
spending $100,000.  Diving by 100, 
$1,000            
 
100
       
 
I f  w e  s p e n d  $ 1 , 0 0 0  p e r  c a p i t a  p e r  y e a r  w e  g e t  a  n u m b e r  o f  j o b s  t h a t  i s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  
population.  This allows us to express the job increase in terms of a percentage point change in 
the employment to population ratio (epop). 
 
$1,000                 ∗
    
   
∗ 100 
$1,000                %                  
 
Since the population is twice as large as the labor force (310 million/154 million), a one percent 
move in epop translates into a two percent move in the employment rate and a negative two 
percent move in the unemployment rate.   
 
$1,000               2 ∗   %                
  
According to Okun’s law, a one percent fall in unemployment is associated with two percent 
higher gdp over the course of a year. 
 
$1,000               4 ∗   %                 
 
GDP per capita is about $45,000, so $1000 per capita spending should generate a 4* β percent 
increase in GDP per capita. 
 
$1,000                 ∗ $1800                            
 
To translate our jobs per $100,000 in monthly spending into a Keynesian spending multiplier, 
you therefore multiply the coefficient β by 1.8.  The coefficients in the time series regressions are 
in terms of jobs created by spending $100,000 per month, so the coefficients from these 
regressions need to be divided by 12.  The implied Keynesian multiplier is therefore the 
coefficient β multiplied by 0.15.  Table 11 summarizes the implied multipliers. 
 
Our point estimates for the stimulus as a whole suggest multipliers that are lower than the 1.6 
used in the Romer-Bernstein estimates, though standard errors are large enough that we cannot 
reject the higher figure.  Also, by performing the analysis at the state level we rule out national 
effects which suggest that we are understating the impact.  We are more confident that the 
stimulus had at least some positive effect, so perfect crowding out did not occur.  Excluding the 
transfers to the states for education, we find multiplier estimates that are larger than the Romer- 
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Bernstein assumptions.  This holds for both the Infrastructure and low income support 
categories. 
 
Table 11:  Implied Keynesian Multipliers 
 
Cross Sectional Regressions 
Category of Spending  Jobs per $100,000 
 
Implied Multiplier 
All 0.59  1.06 
Low Income Support  1.09  1.96 
Teachers/Police -1.84  -3.31 
DOT/DOE/EPA 1.03  1.85 
 
Time Series Regressions 
Category of Spending  Jobs per $100,000 
per month (peak) 
Implied Multiplier 
All 3.1  0.47 
Low Income Support  15.4  2.31 
Teachers/Police -4.7  -0.71 
DOT/DOE 12.3  1.85 
All but Education  14.1  2.12 
 
 
VIII. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
We have presented one of the first detailed analyses of employment and earnings effects from 
the stimulus package that uses actual employment outcomes.13  This is important because the 
debate about the efficacy of fiscal policy has remained mired in the same arguments that were 
being made in January 2010.  We hope that our analysis helps to move the discussion forward.  
This is important because the ARRA represents the largest exercise of countercyclical fiscal 
policy in the post war period.  Analyses of the efficacy of the ARRA are likely to set the baseline 
for discretionary fiscal policy going forward. 
 
Our results are somewhat mixed, but generally support the effectiveness of the ARRA.  Our 
point estimates for the stimulus as a whole suggest that it was somewhat less effective than 
anticipated by the administration, but that their estimates are well within our confidence 
intervals.  Overall we find a cost per job between $100,000 and $400,000 depending on our 
specification.  This implies overall Keynesian multipliers between 0.5 and 2.0.  By performing a 
state level analysis, we are excluding impacts that cross state lines, which is likely biasing our 
estimates of the effectiveness down. 
 
                                                           
13As far as we know, Wilson (2010) was the first paper to attempt a real time analysis of the stimulus.  Our cross 
sectional results are broadly consistent with his.  
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Perhaps most intriguing is our analysis of how the impacts on employment appear to differ by 
type of spending.  Transfers to the states to support education and law enforcement appear to 
have little effect.  This is consistent with a model where the states consider the grants to be 
temporary and therefore avoid making permanent changes based on the transfer.  States may 
have used the money to lower borrowing or limit tax increases.  Cogan and Taylor (2010) find 
that this is the case. 
 
On the other hand, support for low income households appear to have been extremely effective 
with Keynesian multipliers of over 2 and a cost per job of under $100,000.  This is consistent 
with low income individuals having a high marginal propensity to consume.  Infrastructure 
spending such as highway projects had impacts that were nearly a large.  This all suggests that a 
stimulus package that did not include state level grants for local services would have been more 
effective per dollar than the actual stimulus package. 
 
All of these conclusions are necessarily preliminary and incomplete.  The empirical fiscal policy 
literature suggests that the effects of fiscal policy shocks can persist for years.  Our results 
necessarily are limited to 2-3 quarters of data after the shocks.  It will be some time before we 
can put together a full picture of the impacts of the ARRA but we think this preliminary analysis 
is valuable.  We hope that this paper will help to set the stage for further analysis and move the 
ongoing debate in a new direction that is more directly informed by the data. 
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 Outlays as of 
 9/2010 
 (millions)  
 Health and Human Services             84,275  
   Grants to States for Medicaid            72,221  
   Emergency Fund for State Temporary Assistance for Needy Families             2,679  
   Children and Families Services Programs             1,588  
   Payments to States for Child Support Enforcement and Family Support             1,413  
   Payments to States for the Child Care and Development Block Grant             1,340  
 Department of Education             62,194  
   State Fiscal Stabilization Fund            35,352  
   Student Financial Assistance            15,345  
   Special Education             6,102  
   Compensatory Education for the Disadvantaged             4,823  
 Department of Labor             61,928  
   Payments to the Unemployment Trust Fund - Recovery Act            36,628  
   Federal Addtl Unemployment Compensation Program            13,928  
   Unemployment Trust Fund             8,344  
   Training and Employment Services             2,256  
 Department of Transportation             20,344  
   Highway Infrastructure Investment            14,224  
   Transit Capital Assistance             3,100  
 Department of Agriculture             17,592  
   Food Stamp Program            15,616  
 Housing and Urban Development               6,377  
   Public Housing Capital Fund - Recovery Act             1,996  
   Project-Based Rental Assistance             1,967  
   Home Investment Partnership Program - Recovery Act             1,027  
 Department of Energy               4,342  
   Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy - Recovery Act             3,685  
 Environmental Protection Agency               3,720  
   State and Tribal Assistance Grants             3,634  
 Department of Justice               2,084  
   State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance             1,875  
 National Science Foundation                  597  







Summary Statistics at the State Level 
 
Employment data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Employment Statistics data. 
(http://www.bls.gov/sae/#tables).   State level stimulus spending data are from recovery.gov agency level 
reports. (http://www.recovery.gov/FAQ/Pages/DownloadCenter.aspx).  Seniority of congressional 
delegation is average seniority rank from 1 to 435 with 1 being the most senior. 
 
VARIABLE OBS  MEAN  STD. 
DEV. 
MIN  MAX 
           
Change Emp to Pop 2/09 to 10/10  50  -0.0090  0.0069 -0.0395  0.0103 
Change Log Ave Earnings 2/09 to 10/11  50  -0.0188  0.0131 -0.0690  0.0179 
Change Log Emp 2/09 to 10/12  50  0.0375  0.0540 -0.1127  0.1622 
Stimulus Capita in $00,000  50  0.0112  0.0034 0.0075  0.0282 
Dept Transportation Stimulus Capita in $00,000  50  0.0016  0.0008 0.0009  0.0048 
Dept Educ Stimulus Capita in $00,000  50  0.0032  0.0004 0.0026  0.0051 
HHS Stimulus Capita in $00,000  50  0.0020  0.0009 0.0011  0.0069 
Dept Energy Stimulus Capita in $00,000  50  0.0009  0.0010 0.0003  0.0044 
Mean Seniority Rank of Congressional Delegation  50  174.1191  50.6248 50.6667  280.2222 





County Level  Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
           
Stimulus Per Capita in $000  3128  0.304  0.749 0.000  17.220 
County Population  3128  89937  293022 67  9519338 






State Level Regressions of Employment Changes on Stimulus 
 
Cols (1)-(2) are the long difference in employment to population ratio (employment per capita) regressed 
on stimulus per capita. Stimulus per capita is expressed in hundreds of thousands of dollars per person.  
Column (3) instruments for stimulus per capita with the seniority (average rank) of the states' 
congressional (US House) delegations. Cols 5-6 are state*month level Jan 2007-Oct 2010 with state and 
month fixed effects.   
  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
 Change  in 
Emp/Pop 








Feb 09 to 












Stimulus Per   0.541  0.591  1.064    1.383 2.325 
Cap $'00,000 
 
(0.283)+ (0.364)  (0.594)+    (0.368)** (1.102)* 
ln(pop)   0.0003         
   (0.0012)         
Mean Seniority         -0.000033     
House Reps 
 
      (0.000008)*     
Constant -0.015  -0.020  -0.021  0.017  0.462 0.453 
 (0.003)**  (0.021)  (0.007)**  (0.002)**  (0.004)** (0.021)** 
Observations 50  50  50  50  2300 2300 
R-squared 0.071  0.072  0.005  0.243  0.979 0.978 
Standard  errors  in  parentheses        






State Level Regressions of Employment on Stimulus By Sector of Employment 
 
Regressions are as in Table II column (1) but employment is divided into all government employment, 
federal government, state government, local government and private sector.  All columns are OLS and use 
state level long differences from Feb 2009 to Oct 2010.   
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) 












0.206 0.007  0.059  0.136 0.900 
  in $'00,000  (0.069)**  (0.021)  (0.031)+  (0.055)* (0.326)** 
Constant -0.002  0.000  -0.001  -0.002 -0.008 
 (0.001)**  (0.000)  (0.000)+  (0.001)** (0.004)* 
Observations 50  40  48  50 50 
R-squared 0.158  0.003  0.073  0.113 0.137 
 
 Standard  errors  in  parentheses       
  + significant at 10%; * significant at  5%;  **  significant  at  1%       




State Level Regressions of Employment By Type of Stimulus Spending 
 
State Level Long Diff in Employment Per Capita Regressed on various categories of stimulus spending per 
capita.  Based on the project level data, we created three categories of stimulus spending.   Dept of 
Transportation and Dept of Energy projects are largely about construction and infrastructure.  Dept of 
Education, Justice, and Dept of Homeland security provided block grants intended to enable retention of 
state and local government employees while Health and Human Services, HUD, and the Dept of 
Agriculture spending was largely on support for low income families. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Change in Emp/Pop 
Feb 09 to Oct 10 
Change in Emp/Pop 
Feb 09 to Oct 10
Change in Emp/Pop 
Feb 09 to Oct 10 
DOT_DOE_EPA_capita 1.030     
(Infrastructure Spending) 
 
(0.679)     
ED_DOJ_capita    -1.836   
(Municipal Transfers) 
 
  (2.477)   
HHS_HUD_USDA_capita      1.088 
(Low Income Support) 
 
    (0.728) 
Constant -0.012  -0.003  -0.012 
 (0.002)**  (0.008)  (0.002)** 
Observations 50  50  50 
R-squared 0.046  0.011  0.044 
  Standard errors in parentheses       
  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
 
                       
Table 6 
County Level Regressions of Employment By Type of Stimulus Spending 
 
Data on stimulus spending aggregates recipient reported data.  Spending is aggregated to the county level 
using the recipient's zip code.   We drop the counties that contain the state capitals and we drop amounts 
that are not categorized as locally spent, ie block grants which are passed through to the ultimate 
recipient.  Employment data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Employment Census. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 










Stimulus Spending  0.152  0.049  3.341   
Per Cap $00,000 
 
(0.040)**  (0.037)  (1.180)**   
Mean Seniority        -7.03e-06 
House Reps 
 
     (2.02e-06)** 
Constant -0.009  -0.012  -0.022 0.004 
 (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.003)** (0.000)** 
Observations 3078  3078  3076 3076 
R-squared 0.005  0.001   0.004 
Standard errors in parentheses         




County Level Change In Log Wages 
 
We regress the change in log average wage Feb 2009 to Oct 2010 on per capita stimulus spending.  Wage 
data are from the Quarterly Employment Census.  Stimulus spending is in hundreds of thousands of 
dollars per capita. 
 
 (1)  (2) 
  Change in Log Wage  Change in Log Wage IV 
Stimulus Spending Per  2.755  10.263 
Capita '00,000  (0.240)**  (4.767)* 
Constant 0.014  -0.007 
 (0.001)**  (0.014) 
Observations 3078  3076 
R-squared 0.041   
Standard errors in parentheses     




County Level Jobs Reported Created or Saved Regressed on Stimulus Spending 
 
We regress per capita reported jobs created or saved on per capita stimulus spending.  Jobs created data 
are aggregated from recipient level reports.  We exclude state capitals and money not categorized as 
locally spent. 
 
 (1)  (2) 
  Reported Jobs Saved Per Capita 
(Equal Weighted) 
 
Reported Jobs Saved Per Capita 
Pop Weighted 
Stimulus Spending Per  0.361  0.349 
Capita '00,000 
 
(0.011)**  (0.008)** 
Constant 0.001  0.000 
 (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Observations 3078  3078 
R-squared 0.248  0.381 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
 




Monthly Change In Employment Per Capita on Monthly Change in Stimulus Per Capita 
 
Monthly Panel with Outlays and 6-8 Lags.  Dependent variable is  change in employment per capita.  
Right hand side variables are leads and lags of changes in stimulus outlays per capita.  Stimulus outlays 
are reported monthly by agency for each state.   
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  All Outlays 
with 6 Lags 
All Outlays 
with 8 Lags 
All Outlays 
Drop Alaska 





            
Lagged epop        0.0724     
       (0.07)     
Two Month Lead  0.177  0.179  -0.00130  0.186  0.429  1.073 
 (0.27)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.27)  (0.31)  (1.60) 
One month lead   -0.230  -0.192  -0.0718  -0.193  0.160  -0.698 
 (0.33)  (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.39)  (2.10) 
Stimulus per cap  -0.122  -0.00905  -0.0214  0.00841  0.263  4.972+ 
 (0.36)  (0.37)  (0.41)  (0.36)  (0.48)  (2.59) 
One month lag  0.122  0.295  0.0769  0.296  0.354  4.226* 
 (0.38)  (0.42)  (0.39)  (0.40)  (0.63)  (1.70) 
Two month lag  0.387  0.636  0.400  0.619  0.867  -0.701 
 (0.46)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.47)  (0.68)  (2.41) 
Three month lag  0.825*  1.151**  0.929*  1.104**  1.268+  1.503 
 (0.40)  (0.42)  (0.39)  (0.40)  (0.65)  (2.58) 
Four month lag  -0.365  0.0686  0.270  -0.00852  0.188  0.0942 
 (0.58)  (0.51)  (0.53)  (0.53)  (0.55)  (2.56) 
Five month lag  -0.581+  -0.0372  -0.133  -0.0392  -0.233  3.984 
 (0.32)  (0.39)  (0.41)  (0.39)  (0.53)  (3.99) 
Six month lag  -0.500  0.152  -0.181  0.161  0.155  4.096* 
 (0.38)  (0.58)  (0.50)  (0.56)  (0.75)  (1.98) 
Seven month lag    0.816  0.497  0.821+  0.608  -0.466 
   (0.50)  (0.41)  (0.48)  (0.67)  (1.74) 
Eight month lag    0.239  0.115  0.201  0.409  -0.567 
   (0.35)  (0.36)  (0.36)  (0.41)  (1.75) 
            
Constant 0.000647**  -0.000734**  -0.000736**  -0.000683**  -0.000741**  -0.000741** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
            
Observations 1850  1750  1715  1750  1750  1750 






Monthly Change In Employment Per Capita on Monthly Change in Stimulus Per Capita 
By Federal Agency 
 
Monthly Panel using outlays and 8 Lags.  Dependent variable is  change in employment per capita.  Right 
hand side variables are leads and lags of changes in stimulus outlays per capita.  Stimulus outlays are 




 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 










             
One month lead  1.082  -2.933  -1.010  -0.0718 0.160  3.352* 
 (2.03)  (4.07)  (0.63)  (0.31) (0.63)  (1.53) 
One month lead  -0.809  2.879  -1.644+  0.296 -1.213  -2.499 
 (2.72)  (3.94)  (0.89)  (0.53) (0.99)  (3.14) 
Change stimulus capita  4.504  3.082  -0.868  -0.458 -0.823  8.842* 
 (3.06)  (5.68)  (0.67)  (0.57) (0.91)  (3.36) 
One month lag  2.652  2.349  0.655  -0.761 0.387  12.15* 
 (1.60)  (6.67)  (0.62)  (0.64) (1.55)  (5.06) 
Two month lag  -1.055  -11.09  -0.164  -0.331 2.410  4.643+ 
 (2.69)  (10.35)  (0.61)  (0.82) (1.85)  (2.57) 
Three month lag  1.668  -13.92  0.688  0.188 1.893  3.566 
 (2.96)  (9.69)  (0.62)  (0.80) (1.44)  (3.98) 
Four month lag  -0.937  2.356  -0.377  -0.318 -0.413  5.768 
 (3.12)  (10.04)  (0.84)  (1.00) (1.20)  (3.59) 
Five month lag  3.534  3.220  0.338  -1.080 -0.835  8.482+ 
 (4.64)  (11.87)  (0.84)  (0.78) (1.03)  (4.27) 
Six month lag  2.893  14.63  -0.156  -1.262 0.824  14.49+ 
 (2.10)  (20.34)  (0.97)  (0.76) (1.24)  (7.84) 
Seven month lag  -0.895  8.542  1.227  -0.244 1.504  1.471 
 (1.93)  (7.77)  (0.81)  (0.72) (1.76)  (7.24) 
Eight month lag  -0.624  7.820  -0.691  0.340 0.983  -1.918 
 (1.90)  (12.04)  (0.57)  (0.64) (1.00)  (5.35) 
             
Constant -0.000707**  -0.000692**  -0.000691**  -0.000677** -0.000712**  -0.000747** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
             
Observations 1750  1750  1750  1750 1750  1750 
R-squared 0.48  0.47  0.47  0.47 0.48  0.47 
 